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n  County-to-county mobility drops 
significantly when counties are 
separated by state borders.
n  This drop is not driven by 
differences in local characteristics or 
in moving costs related to state-level 
policy.
n  State borders also affect county-
to-county social connectedness 
(Facebook friendships), suggesting 
that personal ties, lack-of-information 
friction, or home-state identity might 
be at play.
n  Counties on state borders that face 
this migration stickiness have weaker 
recoveries after cyclical downturns, 
such as the Great Recession.
For additional details, see the full working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/358/.
The United States has traditionally been seen as a highly mobile country, with nearly 
one in fve people changing their county of residence every fve years. Even though 
internal migration has steadily declined over the past 40 years, the United States still 
exhibits higher internal mobility than most European countries (Molloy et al. 2011). 
Geographic mobility is ofen viewed as both an opportunity for individuals to fnd better 
job opportunities and a mechanism through which places adjust to economic change, 
both positive (people move in) and negative (people move out); both channels contribute 
to labor market fuidity and economic dynamism (Blanchard and Katz 1992; Molloy et al. 
2016). 
However, local economic conditions vary considerably across the country. Most 
counties are within an hour’s drive of another county that has higher average wages, 
lower average house prices, or both. Although there might be other characteristics 
that ofset these raw diferences, many individuals could plausibly encounter better 
employment or housing opportunities a relatively short distance away, either through 
migration or commuting. Factors that reduce or limit this internal migration or 
commuting could depress economic growth. 
In a related paper, I study a novel aspect of U.S. internal migration and commuting 
across counties. Drawing on IRS data on county-to-county migration and census data on 
county-to-county commuting, I show that, even conditional on distance, cross-county 
migration and commuting drop signifcantly when a state border lies between the two 
counties. People are three times as likely to move to a diferent county in the same state— 
and about twice as likely to commute to a diferent county in the same state—as to move 
to an equally distant county in a diferent state (see Figure 1, next page). In other words, 
state borders reduce both residential and employment mobility. Because there are no 
legal or residency restrictions associated with state borders (as there are with national 
borders), this pattern is perhaps unexpected. Such migration “frictions” could also shape 
the way places respond to local economic shocks. 
Why State Borders Could Matter 
Economists typically model the decision to migrate as a choice between locations 
based on the costs and benefts associated with making the move. An individual will 
move from County A to County B if the net beneft they get from County B over County 
A exceeds the costs of moving there. Tis simple framework suggests three potential 
explanations for the drop in mobility at state borders. First, local characteristics that 
provide benefts (e.g., good schools or transit options) could discretely change at state 
borders, leading to abrupt diferences in the propensity to make such a move. Second, 
state policies could impose extra costs on cross-border moves (e.g., occupational 
licensing or higher taxes), discouraging people from leaving the state. Finally, the 
“connectedness” of counties could fall across state lines. For example, people might be 
hesitant to switch to a new state if they have fewer friends or family ties there, or if their 
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People are three times 
as likely to move to a 
diferent county in the 
same state as to move to 
an equally distant county 
in a diferent state. 
Local Characteristics Don’t Drive the State Border Mobility Gap 
If large diferences in benefts at state borders were behind the mobility gap, we 
would expect to see diferences in local characteristics that people care about, such as 
economic opportunities, housing afordability, weather, political attitudes, and local 
school performance. However, this does not appear to be the case. When I examine the 
diference in several characteristics between counties in the same state and counties in an 
adjacent state, I do not fnd any sudden jump to have occurred as the distance between 
the two groups shrinks. In other words, employment rates, average wages, population, 
demographic composition, industry composition, housing prices, weather, voting 
patterns, and school outcomes are all similar across state borders. Figure 1 shows that 
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NOTE: The circles show migration rates (Panel A) or commuting rates (Panel B) between pairs of counties, 
aggregated by distance and whether the pairs are in the same or diferent states. They represent statistical 
estimates that have been adjusted for diferences between county characteristics in each, as detailed in 
the paper, and thus can be slightly negative. The horizontal axis indicates the distance in miles between 
county-pair centers, where centers are population-weighted centroids. 
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using 2017 IRS SOI county-to-county fows and 2017 LEHD LODES. 
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Mobility drops at state 
borders, even when 
controlling for detailed 
local characteristics of 
origin and destination 
counties. 
controlling for these characteristics does not afect the migration gap at state borders, 
suggesting the drop in mobility there is not driven by diferences in local characteristics. 
State Policies Don’t Drive the State Border Mobility Gap 
If state policies that caused higher moving costs at state borders were driving the 
mobility gap, we would expect patterns to be asymmetric across states. For example, 
if diferences in state income taxes played a role, there should be larger state border 
migration penalties in moving from low-tax to high-tax states, but smaller migration 
penalties (or even bonuses) in the reverse direction. Tis also does not appear to be the 
case. Conditional on distance, crossing state borders is associated with a similar drop in 
migration regardless of whether the potential destination has higher or lower taxes than 
the point of origin. Tis pattern holds not just for taxes (income, sales, or corporate), but 
also for the generosity of several state programs and policies (EITC, Medicaid, TANF, 
school funding, minimum wage) and the stringency of occupational licensing. 
The Role of Social Connectedness 
If diferences in local characteristics and state policies don’t drive migration gaps at 
state borders, diferences in “social connectedness” across areas might. Drawing upon the 
Social Connectedness Index, which measures Facebook friendship rates between pairs 
of counties (Bailey et al. 2018), I fnd a similar drop-of in county-to-county friendship 
rates at state borders. Conditional on distance, people have about half as many Facebook 
friends across state lines as they do in counties within the same state (see Figure 2). 
It is challenging to determine causality from this relationship, as social networks 
could afect migration but migration could also afect social networks. Nonetheless, the 
correlation is consistent with several potential mechanisms. Individuals might face large 
psychic costs when moving away from friends and family. If individuals have fewer friends 
across state borders, psychic costs would be larger for moves that cross state lines. Having 
fewer social connections across the state border could also impede the fow of information, 
leading to more uncertainty and reducing people’s willingness to change states. 
Figure 2  County-to-County Facebook Friendship Rates Also Drop Of at State 
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NOTE: The circles show the number of Facebook friends per 1,000 residents, as measured in the Social 
Connectedness Index, between pairs of counties, aggregated by distance and whether the pairs are in the 
same or diferent states. The number of Facebook friends has been scaled to protect privacy, so values can 
fall below 0. See note to Figure 1. 
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using 2016 Social Connectedness Index (Bailey et al. 2018). 
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Conditional on distance, 
people have about half as 
many Facebook friends 
across state lines as they 
do in counties within the 
same state. 
A third factor that infuences both cross-border social connectedness and mobility 
could also be at play. People might exhibit a behavioral quirk known as the endowment 
efect, in which it is especially costly to give up things one is initially “endowed” with. 
What would this look like in the migration decision? Tis might show up as a home 
state identity. People identify with the state that they were born in or grew up in, and it is 
thus costly for them to consider moving away. Unfortunately, few data sources allow the 
exploration of this type of mechanism. However, there are several pieces of suggestive 
evidence. When looking at the American Community Survey, an annual survey of more 
than one million U.S. households, movers who were living in their state of birth are less 
than half as likely to move out of state as movers who were already living outside their 
birth state. Using data from a small survey on mobility conducted by the Pew Research 
Center in 2008, I fnd that 68 percent of respondents say that they live in their birth state 
because “they feel like they belong [there]” or because their birth state is the place they 
most identify with. A large share of people thus exhibit a birth-state identity, and in the 
survey these individuals were less likely to have ever moved out of state. Interestingly, 
when asked hypothetical questions about moving, individuals who exhibit a birth-state 
identity are less likely to report willingness to move only if they are currently living in 
their birth state. Tis is consistent with an endowment efect, making it costly to move 
away from one’s state of birth. 
Policy Implications: Does This Pattern in Mobility Matter for Labor Markets? 
Regardless of why state borders afect mobility, understanding how this pattern 
infuences labor markets has important policy implications. Recent research fnds that 
places that experienced larger downturns during the Great Recession took longer to 
recover economically and fell behind less afected areas, even years later (Hershbein and 
Stuart 2020). Building on this work, I test to see whether this pattern difers for counties 
at state borders (where this mobility “friction” is likely more binding) relative to counties 
in the interior of the state (see Figure 3). I fnd that the pattern is stronger in border 
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NOTE: The estimates show the year-by-year (approximate) impact of a 1 percent greater decrease in 
commuting-zone employment between 2007 and 2009 on the percentage change in employment in other 
years, separately for counties on state borders and those in the interior of the state. 
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. 
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Previous research 
has found that local 
areas sufering greater 
employment losses 
during a recession are 
slow to recover, and I fnd 
that this pattern is even 
stronger in counties along 
state borders than in 
interior counties. 
counties, where recoveries from employment losses occur even more slowly. Consistent 
with the mobility pattern, border counties also see lower in-migration and in-commuting 
during the recovery period, potentially limiting the dynamism of these local economies. 
Tese patterns in turn may help us better understand the variation in economic success 
and growth across areas of the United States and highlight why some places are slow 
to bounce back from economic downturns. Tey also are relevant for the evaluation of 
social safety-net and place-based policies, as migration frictions can afect who stays, 
who comes in, and how both afect the recovery path from a local recession. 
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